The flooding accident of the Gungpyeong 2 underpass in Osong-eup, Heungdeok-gu, Cheongju, Chungcheongbuk-do, where 24 casualties occurred on the 15th, was due to poor management of the Mihocheon Bridge construction site on the Miho River and ignoring warnings by related organizations such as local governments. It was investigated that the situation occurred at the same time.
Regarding the accident, the Office for Government Policy Coordination, which conducted an inspection and investigation on 95 people from Chungcheongbuk-do, Cheongju, the Multifunctional Administrative City Construction Agency (Happiness Office), the Chungbuk Police Agency, and the Chungbuk Fire Headquarters on the 17th to 26th, said on the 28th that six officials from Cheongju City and officials from the Chungbuk Fire Headquarters were arrested. It was announced that an additional 18 people, including 5, would be requested to the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office for investigation.
As a result, the number of people requested to investigate the accident increased to 36.
Apart from the request for investigation, 63 public officials from the five institutions whose negligence was confirmed will be notified to their affiliated institutions for disciplinary action.
In this regard, the Office of State Affairs is strongly considering a proposal to dismiss Lee Sang-rae, the head of the Happiness Office, as a censure measure for not fulfilling his on-site management responsibilities.
Bang Bang-kyu, head of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, announced the results of the inspection including these details at the Seoul Government Complex.
The poor embankment under the Mihocheongyo Bridge is a ‘preceding factor’… ‘Ignoring warnings’ before and after heavy rainThe Office for Government Policy Coordination said that the cause of the accident was a combination of preceding factors and insufficient measures taken on the day.
First, while carrying out the ‘Osong-Cheongju (Section 2) Road Expansion Construction’ on the Miho River near the Gungpyeong 2 Underpass, the construction company removed the embankment under the Mihocheon Bridge without permission and built a poor temporary embankment, and the local government Failure to monitor and supervise properly was pointed out as a leading factor.
It is explained that the Miho River overflowed when heavy rain poured down in a situation where the embankment was in poor condition, and the underpass about 550 meters away was submerged helplessly.
According to the Office for Government Policy Coordination examining the facts before and after the accident, it started to rain in Cheongju on the 13th, two days before the accident, and a heavy rain warning was issued at 12:10 noon on the 14th, the previous day.
In addition, a flood warning was already issued at the Mihocheongyo branch at 5:20 pm the day before the accident, and a higher level of flood warning was issued at 4:10 am on the day of the accident, but neither the local government nor the fire department took any necessary action.
The water level of the Miho River gradually rose, and at 6:40 a.m., two hours before the accident, the water level rose to 29.02m above sea level, the planned flood level of the Mihocheongyo Bridge, but the control of the underground car was not carried out.
It was investigated that residents who sensed the danger in a situation where the temporary embankment, a ‘time bomb’, barely endured, reported several times to 112 and 119.
At 7:04 am and 7:58 am, about an hour before the accident, 112 reports came in, and 119 reports were received at 7:51 am, but no one delivered the necessary measures.
It turned out that several reports were also received by local governments.
Mr. A, the supervisor of the Mihocheongyo construction, reported the danger of flooding to the Happiness Administration, the organization in charge of the construction, by phone and mobile messenger seven times. On the day of the accident, Mr. A also made two 112 calls.
Chungcheongbuk-do received reports from the Happiness Office three times, and Cheongju City received reports from Mr. A and the National Police Agency a total of 10 times, but did not take action.
An official from the Office of State Affairs pointed out, “There were numerous opportunities, but there was no agency that took advantage of those opportunities.”
Eventually, at 7:50 am, 40 minutes before the accident, water began to overflow from the side of the temporary embankment, and at 8:9 am, 20 minutes later, the temporary embankment completely collapsed. And at 8:40, the Gungpyeong 2 underpass was completely submerged in water.
The accident killed 14 people and injured 10 others.
Chief Bang said, “Even though there were many opportunities, measures were not taken, and in the end, tragic damage occurred.” didn’t work,” he pointed out.
A total of 36 people were commissioned to investigate… Lee Sang-rae, head of the Happiness Office, etc. reviewed for potential dismissalThis time, the Office for Government Policy Coordination requested an additional investigation of 18 people, including 6 people from Cheongju City, 5 people from Chungbuk Fire Headquarters, 4 people from Chungcheongbuk-do, 1 person from Happiness Office, Mr. A from the Mihocheongyo construction site, and the representative of the construction company.
The total number of people requested for the investigation, including the subject of the previous request, is 36, including 12 officials at the level of chief, director, and manager, who are executive-level public officials.
Separately, 63 public officials from the five institutions will be notified to their affiliated institutions for disciplinary action.
In addition, the Office for Government Policy Coordination announced that it would pursue personnel measures such as removal of positions for managers with direct responsibility for command and supervision.
Chief Bang said, “Even if you are not the target of an investigation request, all related organizations, regardless of position, will ask for personnel action if there is a need to hold them accountable, and this includes political positions.”
In particular, the Office for Government Policy Coordination, as the head of the agency that ordered the ‘Osong-Cheongju (Section 2) Road Expansion Construction’, is holding direct responsibility for not fulfilling the on-site management responsibilities and is strongly reviewing the proposal for dismissal.
An official from the Office for Government Policy Coordination said in a phone call with Yonhap News, “We do not seek responsibility just because we are the head of an agency, but we will determine whether the heads of agencies have ‘direct command and supervision responsibility’ in the scope of management of this accident.” It is true that he was an important direct manager바카라사이트.”
In addition, the Office for Government Policy Coordination is reviewing requests for personnel measures for high-ranking political posts such as the administrative governor of Chungcheongbuk-do and the deputy mayor of Cheongju, and the chief of Heungdeok Police Station in Cheongju.
The person in whom the president has personnel authority will suggest measures to President Seok-Yeol Yoon, and if the head of a local government has personnel authority, the request will be made to the head of the local government.
However, the Office for Government Policy Coordination cannot intervene in the future of the elected governor Kim Young-hwan of North Chungcheong Province and Cheongju Mayor Lee Beom-seok.
In relation to the government’s recurrence prevention measures, Bang said, “We are discussing strengthening governance for disaster response, including the inclusion of external disaster experts, improving the control standards for underground roadways, expanding and mandating the installation of entry blocking facilities, river maintenance, and reviewing the management system for areas vulnerable to landslides.” “he said.
He also added, “The improvement plan will also include system improvements that enable workers with skills and capabilities to work in a situation where they know how to respond through sufficient training, such as providing incentives to workers in the disaster response department.”